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There is no new world order, not the kind President Bush
tried to sell us.

If the world was new and ordered, Saddam

Hussein wouldn't have nerve-gassed his people, Slobodan Milosevic

...

-

wouldn't have been elected, and Bill Clinton would have called
the Rwandan massacres "genocide" sooner.

would be alive instead of slaughtered in the many pockets of
'disorder' where wars rage to forge identity through hate and
oppression and violence.

-

Millions of people

School children wouldn't recognize the

names of shattered nations Bosnia and Rwanda.

The world is no

more ordered or new and moral than it was when Hitler presided

...

over the bureaucratic system that designed the deaths of six

..

million Jews.

..

instead the world has become more disorderly; the illusion of

...

-

..
..

..

Indeed he was much more orderly than most of the

little wars and small-scale genocides we see today.

Perhaps

order in a few sterile governments only a half-truth in the face
of the crumbling of much of the world.

The leaders of the U.S.,

of the EU, of NATO, of the U.N., sit in their offices with the
blinds shut, smoking their cigars, seemingly oblivious to the
death and destruction and randomness that is tearing apart so
many nations, lives, and lands and that will not stop until it
has consumed the newly-paved streets, newly-built skyscrapers,
and newly-bought Cuban cigars of those who did not wish to see it
~oming.

So the way to deal with this problem is to accept that

there is one, first of all.

To want to know the truth, to want

to see whether or not there is genocide being perpetrated here or

-

..

-

-

-
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there, and want to stop it, not avoid it.
causes problems?

Internal or external pressures, or both, or a

special confluence, forcing the combination to a critical mass?
The cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Estonia illustrate
the variety of answers that exist to this question, and by
examining these countries one discovers different results (some
tragedies and a few almost positives) of international
involvement in countries with a history of occupation and
artificially created ethnic tensions.

..

-

-

What determines what

The perceptions and

interests of Western countries determine when and how often they
choose to avoid seeing warning signs of conflict in these areas,
and the contradictions of prioritizing by political interest
instead of by human suffering can be easily explored through the
cases of these three countries.
Throughout the history of Bosnia, Rwanda, and Estonia,
foreign powers have played significant roles in determining the

-

-

-

-

course of their history, and in each managed to exacerbate or
sometimes even create ethnic and religious tensions.

Bosnia-

Herzegovina, which seceded from Yugoslavia in 1992, had not been
an independent state before. 1

Throughout Bosnia's history one

needs to keep the region in the context of what was happening in
the other areas of what would become Yugoslavia, because the
ethnic/religious/historical differences within Bosnia are
sometimes related and sometimes stem from those of Serbia and
Croatia and elsewhere.

Ironically, in true ethnic terms, the

three groups, plus Slovenes, Montenegrins, and Macedonians, are

-

-
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..

all Yugoslavs (South Slavs).2

-

place of many fault lines running across Europe, torn between

-

-

Since the sixteenth century, Bosnia has been the meeting

great powers, ideologies, and religions.

It has always been a

prize sought after, never a people with interests of its own to
be considered.

The Habsburg empire of Austria and Hungary

conquered most of what is now Slovenia and Croatia in the 1100s,
and by the sixteenth century they also ruled over parts of

-

over Bosnia's lands and people.

...

which would have influence in Bosnia has been a recurring theme

...
...

Bosnia-Herzegovina. 3

The Ottoman Turks at the same time had

control of Serbia, Macedonia, and most of Montenegro and BosniaHerzegovina.'

The struggle between these two polyglot empires

and their different methods of rule was one of the first battles
Great powers bickering over

in its history; this theme is found in

th~

histories of Rwanda

and Estonia as well. s
The Turks began to convert the nobility of their new
territories, and concentrated on Bosnia and Herzegovina because

...

...
...
...
...

it bordered Christian territories.

To encourage Bosnians to

convert to Islam, "the Turks applied pressure, along with
economic and political advantages." 6
and others in Bosnia at the time.

There were Serbs, Croats,

Serbs had a strong Eastern

Orthodox tradition, and Croats a commitment to Roman Catholicism,
but many peasants of both faiths converted to gain favor under
the new rulers.?

The Bosnia-Herzegovinians also included

followers of a separate Bosnian Church about which little is

4

..
known; it is thought to have derived from the influence of a
twelfth century sect of heretical Christians called Bogomils.

...

...

..

The Bogomils consistently worked to prevent domination of their
people by either the Western Catholic or the Eastern Orthodox
traditions; consequently, they proved the most receptive to
conversion to Islam.

Thus a completely new population group

appeared in Yugoslavia: Slavic Muslims.

Under the Ottoman

system, the only way to be a free peasant family in Bosnia-

..

..
..

Herzegovina was to become Muslim.

Hence, the previous members of

the landed aristocracy (Serb, Croat, and other non-Muslims) in
the areas of occupation lost their status.

A feudal system

continued in Bosnia up until World War 1. 8

Peasants, about

seventy-five percent of whom were Serb, twenty percent Croat, and
the rest Muslim, worked for Muslim landowners as kmets (similar

..
..
..
..
..

to sharecroppers).

Islamic tendencies throughout the twentieth century.9

..
..

..

Bosniars

changes in social groupings and structure are examples of an
artificially created religious and ethnic situation; the Turks
were a ruling foreign power that altered the composition of its
subject peoples.

Because of this, the 400 years (16th century to

20th) of Ottoman rule in Bosnia has had tremendous consequences.
Most of Bosnia remained under Ottoman control while Serbia
grew restless.

..

These conditions fueled resentment and anti-

Serbs began a period of revolt against the Turks

in 1804 that, along with another major battle in 1815, heralded
the weakening of Ottoman power in Europe.

According to Dragnich,

"By mid-century, after international treaties were affirmed,

-

-

-
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Serbia gained de facto independence;" however, it was 1878 before
the state was formally recognized by the international
community. 10

Bosnia was not able to achieve similar status.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was placed under Austrian control at the
Congress of Berlin in 1878, and annexed by Austria in 1908. 11

It

remained, along with Croatia and Slovenia, a part of the AustroHungarian Empire until the Empire's demise at the end of World
War 1.12

Croatia and Slovenia had been subject to Western

influences and adopted the Latin alphabet and Roman Catholicism,
while Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia were subject to Eastern
influences and adopted the Cyrillic alphabet and the Eastern
Orthodox church. 13

By the mid-nineteenth century, then, Serbs,

Croats, and Bosnians were already divided by history, culture,
religion, and loyalties imposed upon them by outside forces.

-

Bosnia was the meeting point of all these opposing ideas, with
some Bosnians identifying with Croatia, and some with Serbia, and
others with the religion of Islam and neither Croatia nor
Serbia. 14
While these differences fermented quietly, a conflict

-

-

-

between Austria and Serbia was brewing that would send the world
floundering toward war, and the line between the Allies and the
Central powers would run through the middle of Bosnia.

Austria-

Hungary felt threatened by a strong, independent Serbia because
Austria's Slavic subjects might begin to hope for their own
independence, or simply want to leave the Empire and join the new
Slavic state. 1S

Austria also feared the intellectual movement

..
6

for Slavic unity, which, along with its companion movement of
nationalistic pride, had gained fuel from a short Napoleonic

..
-

occupation in the early 1800s. 16

As a result, Austria tried to

find ways to keep Serbia weak, such as annexing Bosnia.

annexation was a blow to Serbia because the Serbs also wanted
influence in Bosnia because it was a Slavic region which could
perhaps unite with the Serb state.

-

-

-

The

It was in Serbia's interests

for Bosnia to remain mostly free at the least; Austria's moves to
overtly control the region would only put the Austro-Hungarian
Empire that much closer to Serbia's doorstep.

Thus Bosnia-

Herzegovina was a pawn in Austria's play for influence and
Serbia's bid for survival in a hostile Europe. l7

Once again

Bosnia was the object of a strategic struggle between two powers
(as when Austria-Hungary was battling the Ottoman empire) in

-

-

-

-

which the desires of the Bosnian people were never considered.
The current power struggle has been a similar situation--Serbia
was fighting Slovenia and Croatia, and Bosnia was in the middle,
and few gave any thought to what the Bosnians wanted or what the
consequences for them might be.
World Wars I and II can be seen as continuations of this
theme of external influences interfering in the development of
Bosnians, and all Yugoslavs.

In 1914, it was with Serbian

interests in mind that Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb PanSlavist, assassinated the heir to the Habsburg throne,
Francis Ferdinand. ls

Ar~hduke

This assassination led to World War I, as

Austria refused to back down from an ultimatum issued to Serbia,

-

7

and Serbia could not acquiesce and retain its sovereignty.

In

the ensuing conflict, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims, and some

-

-

..

-

-

-

..

-

-

-

-

Serbs from the Military Frontier regions (areas on the HabsburgOttoman border) of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Hungary
fought on the side of Austria and the Central Powers, and the
Serbs from Serbia and Montenegro fought with the Allies.19

This

war that so many Slavs participated in was another external
factor that caused division among the Yugoslavs.

They had lived

together mostly peacefully for centuries before this, only to be
forced into conflict because of a slowly crumbling Empire's bid
to crush its rising Slavic rivals.

Almost any small conflict

could have sparked World War I during such an age of competing
militarism in Europe, but the struggle over Bosnia provided the
spark.

World War I could be seen as a warning that arbitrary

decisions about another country's destiny can have horrific
consequences.
After World War I, Bosnia was incorporated into the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, later to be renamed "Yugoslavia."
The unity implied by statehood didn't last long, as World War II
brought external pressures too great for the new state to handle.
A war within a war raged in Yugoslavia, and Bosnia was the site
of most of the atrocities committed in the clash of external and
internal forces.

Hitler set up a Fascist puppet state in Croatia

whose troops (German and Croat, and some others) killed about
200,000 Serb civilians, and tens of thousands of Muslims, Jews,
and Gypsies as well. 20

The Serbian armed forces were mostly

..

8

scattered in the initial Axis invasion and split into factions of
royalists and Communists (to simplify the distinctions), fighting
each other and the German and Croatian troops.21
At the end of the war, Marshall Josip Broz Tito, leader of
the Communist Partisan fighters, came to power with help from
Russian troops.

-

..

-

Tito was responsible for setting up the modern

Yugoslavia: the six republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, and two
autonomous provinces in the area of Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo .
This arrangement lasted until the wars of this decade. 22

The

most pressing issue facing Tito was how to quell the violence
that had been unleashed across the country, and avoid a backlash

..
-

of Serb reprisals against the Croats.

To that end, he severely

punished nationalists and separatists, and basically froze
religious, historical, and cultural divisions in a system of
Communist authoritarianism.

In the government of the state, Tito

tried to maintain a balance of power between the republics by
diffusing what he saw as Serbian hegemony.

To that end, he

placed Serbian Communists in offices outside of Belgrade, so
there was a disproportionate number of Serbs in power in other
republics, and of non-Serbs in power in Serbia. 23

Although the

Communist solutions kept nationalistic passions and hatreds in
check, they failed to establish an alternative, supranational,

-

-

-

Yugoslav movement which the people actually believed in.

Because

of Communist rule and Tito's use of repression, in Yugoslavia
lithe spirit of critical, rational inquiry could not develop,

9

[and] the nations of Yugoslavia failed to free themselves from

-

..

-

pseudoromantic images of themselves and negative stereotypes of
each other. ,,24
Thus Yugoslavia entered the 1980's after Tito's death facing
the crippling realities of unresolved fears and unanswered
stereotypes.

Tito had given Yugoslavia some short term gains.

Slovenia and Croatia had benefitted under Tito's programs of
economic development, but the eastern republics (Bosnia, Serbia,
Montenegro, and Macedonia) had been largely left out.

-

-

-

-

People

lived together in peace for nearly fifty years; in the urban
areas especially, nationalities were fairly well integrated,
tolerant of each other, and frequently intermarried.

However, in

rural, isolated areas, the lack of opportunity to address what
had happened during the war would come back to haunt Yugoslavia
in the long run. 25

If its rural population had a picture of

itself and other nationalities that was limited to grandparents'
stories of heroism and atrocities, how could such a state be
expected to sail smoothly into modern, cohesive, and democratic
statehood?

It simply couldn't, and with the fall of Communism

and the rise of Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic, presidents
of Croatia and Serbia respectively, nationalism was slowly thawed
out of its Titoist deep freeze.

Tudjman and Milosevic both had

designs on Bosnia, as each considered the Bosnians really just
mislabeled Serbs or Croats.
Tudjman and especially Milosevic continued to try and carve
out a destiny for Bosnia.

This led to violence, the warning

...

..
..
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signs of which were ignored by the international community.
Other nations, like Rwanda and Estonia, have similarly complex
histories of external influence and interference in the

..

..

development of social and ethnic divisions in their societies .
For Rwanda, it was the imperialism of the Germans, and then the
Belgians, which began a cycle of interference and machinations
that would not only become policies of divide and rule, but
eventually divide and destroy.
Germans who came to explore the region that would become
Rwanda, the indigenous peoples consisted of three groups: the
Twa, a pygmy people who only made up about one percent of the

..

population; the Hutu, who were mainly peasant cultivators, and

..

in place used the village, usually based around a hill, as the

...
...

..
..

the Tutsi, who generally were cattle owners.

basic political unit of the country.

The social system

There were usually two

local chiefs, one each for the farmers and the herders, and there
were army chiefs over larger areas who tended to be Tutsi. 26

The

distinction at this point between Hutu and Tutsi was not clearly
defined in ethnic or racial terms.

The groups were generally

distinguished through a sort of social caste system, in which the
Tutsis (about 14 percent of the population) had a higher status

..

associated with wealth and cattle ownership, and the Hutus (about

...

roles as farmers; the Twa occupied the very lowest position, and

85 percent of the people) had a lower status because of their

their role in Rwandan society, alone among the other groups, has

..

not changed much over the years.

In this system, there was some

-

-

-

11
potential for social ladder-climbing, as a Hutu who gained wealth
or prestige, or perhaps married into a Tutsi family, could
achieve Tutsi status.

Likewise, if a Tutsi lost wealth, he or

she could be lose status and "become" a HutU. 21
This way of life, although Hutus were generally subordinate
to Tutsis and lived under a Tutsi monarchy, did grant the Hutu
some say in their governance, and in some areas of Rwanda there

..

-

-

was a power structure of Hutu princes.

Thus, by the late 19th

century, Rwanda was not a model of equality, but most people did
have some political rights and the potential for moving up in
society, and one might have eventually seen a systemic evolution
toward greater democracy. 28
However, the late nineteenth century was also the time of
the great "scramble for Africa" by colony-hungry European powers .
The Germans acquired Rwanda in 1896.

Here the Rwandans ceased to

be in control of their own destiny, victims of a stripping away
of their right to self-determination that would have deadly
consequences for future generations. 29

The Germans only had

control of the area from 1896 to 1916; Belgium took over the
colony during World War I, continuing and expanding German
systems of control.

The Belgians slowly phased in a system of

bureaucratic governance in which only Tutsis were allowed to hold
positions.

Both the Germans and the Belgians had immediately

favored the Tutsis, in part because of appearance (although not
uniform by any means, there are racial stereotypes of what
physical characteristics Tutsis and Hutus generally have), as the

...

-

-

12
Tutsis were thought to be taller and lighter-skinned, and partly
because they already seemed to run things.

The Europeans

developed elaborate racial theories to connect their favored
group to Aryan descent in order to justify establishing it as
dominant (and probably to make themselves feel better about
associating with Africans).
It

One of these myths was called the

'Hamitic hypothesis'" and it maintained "that all pre-colonial

civilization in Africa was brought by outsiders, specifically the
Hamitic branch of the Caucasian race."

Scholar Alex de Waal

asserts that this theory "is no longer academically
respectable. ,,30

Such a baseless and biased perception, the norm

for European thinking about Africa, was the kind of foundation
upon which the Belgians built their regime in Rwanda and it
illustrates the dangers of outside control by ignorant leaders,

-

-

...

as well as the power of perception in general to distort the
reality of a situation.
Although they constructed these justifications to let
themselves believe they were rightly supporting some kind of
inherently socially and politically superior race, the Europeans
were in reality just taking away the political and civil rights
of Hutus.

Only those who went through the new European education

system could hold government office; only Tutsi men were allowed
access to this education. 31

Therefore the Hutus and all women

were phased out of political life in Rwanda.

The whole of north-

west Rwanda, which had been independently ruled by Hutu princes,
was not fully brought under Tutsi-Belgian control until 1931. 32

-

-
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The continuing conquest showed a total disregard for the
indigenous forms of government already set up, and dramatically
altered the social customs and governing traditions of the area.
The Belgians decided in 1933-34 that the distinction between Hutu
and Tutsi, which they had already altered by colonial
machinations, should be made even more strict and arbitrary.
Belgian officials assigned every Rwandan an identity card which
defined them as Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa for the rest of their lives.
According to prominent Rwandan human rights activist Monique
Mujawamariya, when the Belgians wanted to do a census of the
population, they found they couldn't tell Hutu and Tutsi citizens
apart, and so instituted an arbitrary and problematic rule.

..

-

-

For

the sake of simplicity they decreed that if one had five cows one
would be considered a Tutsi.

Mujawamariya said this created many

problems because some people tried to buy or borrow cattle in
order to be counted as members of the favored group.33
This was a blatant form of interference--the Belgians
invented rigid definitions of Hutu and Tutsi that simply hadn't
existed before.

Since Belgian officials preferred to govern

through Tutsis, and only Tutsis were to have access to
educational services and other privileges, they must have wanted
a way of identifying who was Tutsi and who was not.

Therefore

they imposed an unchangeable label on every Rwandan in a society

-

which had originally allowed for social mobility.

The Belgians

assigned Rwandans an ethnicity much as one assigns young children
roles in a school play, with patronizing disregard for their own

-

-

14
customs.

The officials tried to mold the African society into a

shape that met their needs.
This policy of assigning ethnicity and elevating the Tutsis
to a higher status was a policy of divide and rule.

Some Tutsis

were happy to cooperate to get the benefits of collaboration, but

-

as in any such situation, those out of power became extremely
resentful.

Some Tutsis also began to feel superior to Hutus,

just as they had been told they were, and in any event, most
wanted to keep their powerful status; the way to do that was to
keep Hutus subservient. 34
Although the histories of Bosnia and Rwanda are of course

-

..
..

-

--

-

quite different, one can already see parallels.

In Bosnia the

Turks "created" a population of Muslims and granted them social
privileges.

Sometimes conversions were voluntary, and sometimes

they were forced, but it was only converts who could own land,
and have any chance of escaping the harsh life of a peasant.
Foreign powers would continue, for the most part, to dictate the
destiny of the country.

In Rwanda as in Bosnia, a foreign regime

"created" distinct populations where there had been none.
and Tutsi had been rather fluid groups.

Hutu

Belgium granted one

group privileges and higher status, and Belgian interference and
later that of other powers would continue in Rwanda's history.
The foreign rulers were different in the two countries, and no
one handed out identity cards in Bosnia, but the influence of
foreign control and the ignoring of the needs and wants of the
indigenous peoples are clearly shared experiences, ones that

-

-
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would later have tragic impacts in both countries.
In the 1950s when Catholic missionaries from Belgium began
to help educate and raise the social consciences of Hutus, Tutsis
began to clamor for independence and demanded an end to this new
European interference in their affairs which now threatened their
hold on power. 35

-

-

-

Belgians.

This of course did not sit well with the

However, in the midst of this, violence broke out in

1959 among Tutsis and Hutus.

Tutsi leaders moved to put down

what they saw as a rebellion, and Belgium responded by stopping
Tutsi retaliation, shifting its policies from that point to favor
Hutu enfranchisement and inclusion in politics.

The Catholic

missionaries had been successful in pleading the case of the
oppressed Hutus to the Belgian government.

But the toll of the

violence that occurred between 1959 and 1962 was large, and "a
horrendous precedent had been set" that would haunt Rwanda up to
the present. 36

In those three years, Hutu had expelled "in the

cruelest fashion, perhaps 100,000 Tutsi," and both sides

..
..
..
-

-

destroyed homes and killed hundreds. 37

The refugees play an

important role in the recent history of Rwanda .
The Hutu held elections in 1960, and as they comprised 85%
of the population, Hutu candidates under party leader Gregoire
Kayabanda won overwhelmingly.

Over the next few years there was

much external involvement in Rwandan affairs, this time at the
request of Rwandans themselves.

The United Nations monitored and

postponed some election processes at the request of Tutsis.

The

U.N. also condemned Belgian favoritism, at this point regarding

-

16
the Hutus.

By placing their support behind Hutus now, Belgium

was holding on to its influence in the country; the imperialists

..

were still practicing divide and rule.

..

for their strict guarding of power over the next 30 years.

-

-

..

Hutu leaders then felt

that the rest of the world was pro-Tutsi; this may help account
There

were instances of sporadic violence as Hutu chiefs' repressions
would force more Tutsis into leaving home, and some refugees
would commit terrorist acts against Hutu officials, perpetuating
a cycle of repression, expulsion, and violence. 38
In 1962, the U.N. agreed to support Rwandan independence
largely because of assurances like an agreement to guarantee
Tutsis two ministerial posts.

However, Kayabanda appointed Hutus

to fill the Tutsi positions 18 months after the Belgians left.39
Thus Rwanda went from one-party colonial rule to one-party
indigenous rule.

The identity cards the Belgians had issued were

kept current (and were used as long as the Hutu held power, in
the 1990s often marking one for life or death), and many other
aspects of the colonial bureaucracy were retained. 40

The Hutu

government became overtly anti-Tutsi, simply reversing roles in
society instead of building a nation-state of parity and justice .
Philip Gourevitch writes in the New Yorker that "Rwanda's

..

revolutionaries had become what V.S. Naipaul calls postcolonial

-

rebelled, while ignoring the fact that their past-masters were

..

-

'mimic men,' who reproduce the abuses against which they

ultimately banished by those they enchained."u
Thus the impact of external forces, such as Belgian rule or

..
..

17

the dictates of the U.N., was extensive.
complicated, for
involvement.

However, it was also

at times Rwandans actually wanted foreign

In part the perceptions of the international

community about who was being oppressed by whom determined some

..

..
..

reactions.

For the Belgians it seems to have been more who could

give them the support they needed to stay in power.

The Hutus

gained in power, they were an 85 percent majority, and the
Belgians backed them up.

In the end it is most often interests

that motivate international political actors.

The Belgians ended

up abandoning the Tutsis to support the Hutus, but the U.N. then
rushed in to protect Tutsi rights, in part because it wanted to
protect stability in the region.

..
..

group (Hutus and Tutsis) felt it had to dominate the other to
ensure its own security.

This feeling illustrates the difficulty

of restoring a balance once the pendulum has been swung one way
or the other, especially in such an artificially created
situation.

..

It became a situation each

After Belgium set up Tutsis as the superior class,

the Hutus would naturally want to retake power, especially as
they make up the majority of the population.

They might have a

tendency to want to rule too harshly, however, because that is
what they suffered under the Tutsis.

Once power is just given,

it is clung to, and when one group succeeds in wresting it away
from the unjust, it will be more likely to be unjust in reaction,

..

not just out of revenge, but out of fear.

No one wants to be

subjugated twice.
To avoid any possibility of a Tutsi takeover, Hutus did

..

..
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..
..

exclude them from the political system.
power politics would be genocide.

The consequences of

Rwanda's complex history

provides some explanation, but the final steps toward mass murder
would be those taken by contemporary leaders, in Rwanda and in

..

the international community .

..

both Bosnia and Rwanda.

..

foreign rulers over the years; though most all were quite harsh

In Estonia, one can find early historical parallels with
The Estonian people had a variety of

masters, the variety may be one reason the Estonians have managed
to keep their problems with minority groups non-violent.
Historian Rein Taagepera has said Estonia benefitted at times
from larger powers' competition over its population and
territory.42

..

..

This occasional positive effect is not found in

most of Rwandan and Bosnian history, in which both countries
generally suffered more from the power struggles waged over their
lands.
From the 13th century until after World War I, Estonia was
ruled by outsiders.

The lands that would become Estonia were

first conquered by the Germans, who came to the Baltic region

..
..

..

after failures in the Crusades.

German rule introduced feudalism

to a land that had been structured around federations of small
village groups.

The hierarchical feudal structure was quite new

to the Estonians, who were forced to become serfs to German
landholders.

The Estonians faced numerous invasions and raids

throughout their history, though German rule was a constant for
about 300 years.

..

Sweden took control of northern Estonia in

...

..

19
1561. 43

The southern part of Estonia was then part of a

Lithuanian-Polish duchy.44

Little changed for the Estonian

peasants, although the famine, plague and war before and after

..

the Swedish rule fixed that era in memory as lithe good old ...
times."

Russian forces then established themselves in Estonia

over the period of years 1704-1710 during the Great Northern War
(1700-1721).

..

in 1917.

Russian rule lasted until the Bolshevik revolution

The Baltic Germans had remained landowners after the

end of German rule but had carried little influence.

After

giving some aid in the Russian takeover, and because they were
generally more educated than the average Russian at that time,
the Baltic Germans were able to reach a high level of political

..
..
..

and social influence under Russian governance. 45
The Estonians were able to take some refuge from their
conquerors through their language.

Estonian is in the same family as Finnish and Hungarian, but all
are very different than the Indo-European languages of most of
the rest of Europe.

..

A Finno-Ugric language,

The language barrier made the lines between

the peasants and everyone else--the Baltic Germans, the rulers of
the moment, Christian missionaries--much clearer. 46
Russian rule was hard on the Estonians but it provided some
benefits.

The Estonians had been ruled by Germans and subject to

influence from German culture for so long that the new influence

..

of Russian culture was almost a balance.

..

with Poland-Lithuania over religious converts in the sixteenth

The Swedish competition

century may have improved Estonian access to schooling as both

..
..
..
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Catholic and Lutheran priests tried to learn the language.
Estonians were thus spared an overwhelming imperial influence .
This helped preserve the Estonian identity and language in spite

..

..

of the small size of the population."
Serfdom was abolished in 1816 in the Baltic provinces, but
not in Russia.

This 'freedom' ended up more dangerous for the

peasants than feudalism, however.

Peasants were no longer

property, and therefore the land owners would not lose anything

..

if they worked a peasant to death.48
By the mid nineteenth century there were peasant revolts
because of harsh conditions.

..

altered conditions.

By 1905, the Russian revolution

Martial law was declared after the Estonians

called for autonomy within the Russian empire.

By 1906 some

actual progress was being made, and officials set up some
Estonian language schools.

However, World War I interrupted

whatever further reforms might have been possible. 49

..

The Estonians generally viewed the war as a Russian-German
conflict, and they definitely favored the Russians after their
long servitude to the Baltic barons of the German upper class.
Thus 100,000 men joined up, about 20 percent of the population at
the time.

World War I was an external struggle in which the

Estonians were able to playa real part.

They felt they were

fighting against years of German domination, and that they would

...

..
...

be able to earn autonomy from the Russians in the end. 50

In some

ways this was an external conflict which would become a fight
over who would control Estonia; more foreign bickering over a

-
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place with its own people whose desires were disregarded.
By February 1918, with Russia floundering and the Germans

-

invading, Estonia declared independence.
celebrated as Independence Day.

February 24 is still

The Germans occupied Estonia

until their surrender to the allies in November 1918.

The

Bolshevik forces almost immediately tried to move back onto

...

Estonian territory.
Russian forces.

A new war ensued between Estonian and these

With a little luck, a little money from Finland,

and a little naval maneuvering by Britain, the Estonians drove
the Bolsheviks out.

A peace treaty was signed in Tartu on 2

February, 1920, recognizing Estonian independence and fixing its

...

-

borders.

In 1919, there were also brief pitched battles with

German mercenary forces.

The German army was still trying to

keep some control over the Baltics, and had mercenaries on the
side of the "Whites" in Latvia, where initially Latvian "Red"
forces backed the Bolsheviks.

In the end, Estonian troops helped

win the long final battle at Cesis on June 23, 1919 for a

-

democratic Latvian government.

This is celebrated as victory

day, even though an armistice with the Russians wasn't signed
until 31 December, 1919--indicative of the huge symbolic
significance that the June victory had as revenge against their

.

old oppressors. 51

-

to set its own borders.

-

An important consequence of Estonian victory was the chance
Estonia had a distinct advantage over

both Bosnia (within Yugoslavia) and Rwanda because it was a
small, distinct area of one ethnic group and one language, and

-
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had fairly clear borders on three sides (a sea on two, a lake on
one other).

There were Estonians in other areas of course, but

few concentrated or concerned enough with rejoining Estonia to
cause problems.

-

An area beyond the Narva river that was mostly

Russian was given back to Estonia because it had historically
been part of Estonia.

However, there was an area of Estonians in

one nearby Russian province that was not ceded to the new

-

country.

Coincidentally the numbers mostly balanced out. 52

Perhaps Estonia was thus less an artificial creation than
Yugoslavia or Rwanda, because the Estonian people were basically
homogenous, for the most part all were Estonians culturally and

...

-

-

linguistically.53

Yugoslavia was created from a movement for

Slavic unity, but it was a lofty, intellectual movement at best.
Thus Yugoslavia was more "created" by the Versailles treaty than
one can say of Estonia.

Rwanda was invented by the European

imperialists and mapmakers, and did not conform to much of any
traditional border or social or ethnic distinction.

Europeans

delineated African borders according to where they had sent
explorers, and what could be agreed upon in conferences in
European capitals like Berlin.
Thus Estonia was in better shape than most new states in the

..

interwar years: clear boundaries, stable government (democratic
with authoritarian interlude 1934-1938), mostly homogenous
population, and good trade.

-

-

International recognition came first

from the Soviets with the Tartu treaty.

European recognition

came about a year later, in January 1921; Estonia joined the

-

-
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League of Nations in 1921 as well.

The

u.s.

did not recognize

Estonia until 1922. 54

-

-

It is important to note the situation of minorities in
Estonia.

The new nation was 8 percent Russian, 1.5 percent

German, .5 percent Jewish, and .5 percent Swedish.

The Estonian

government set up programs of cultural autonomy, both for
concentrated groupings of minorities and for those more spread
out.

This "non-territorial cultural autonomy" system allowed the

Russian and Swedish populations to have schools run in Russian or
Swedish and to have local self-government.
well.

It worked out very

Minority groups were not completely integrated into the

society, but it was a good start, and much better than some

-

-

-

..

-

..

-

-

countries. 55
However, the onset of World War II interrupted the natural
course of national development.

Estonia and the other Baltic

nations tried to remain neutral, but their geopolitical situation
did not permit such a straightforward course.

The Molotov-

Ribbentrop nonaggression pact signed in August 1939 by Germany
and the Soviet Union included secret protocols that divided
Eastern Europe between them in the event of war.

The USSR was to

get part of Poland and all of Estonia, among other things.

The

protocol read:
IIIIn the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in
the areas belonging to the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall
represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany
and the USSR. t 1156
The unemotional carving up of Estonia and the other Eastern

-

-

-

..

-

-
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Europeans countries is an ultimate example of blatant foreign
interference.

The aims were purely territorial and strategic,

with no concern for the peoples involved.
Consequently, World War II cast a shadow across Estonia's
future.

First, in 1939 after the German invasion of Poland, part

of Poland and then most of Lithuania was given to the U.S.S.R. by
Germany.

Then Soviet army forces marched to the Estonian border

and demanded army bases.
hadn't mobilized.

Estonia was outnumbered ten to one and

Therefore leaders chose to accept a "pact of

defense and mutual assistance with the USSR." on 28 September
1939. 57

This symbolized the end of Estonian independence for the

next 50 years.

-

-

Estonia faced a rapid yet subtle takeover in 1940, as the
Soviets tried to paint their actions as justified because the
Estonians had supposedly gone back on an important treaty.58 The
Soviets deported Estonia's former head of state.

This incident

was a great insult because Estonia was still technically
independent.

Estonia was formally annexed in August 1940. 59

-

Mass deportations began in 1941--over 6,000 at once in one area.

-

Soviets and to escape a similar fate.

-

-

Men took to the forests in a guerrilla campaign to resist the

taking Tallinn on 28 August 1941.

Then the Germans returned,

They were welcomed by some

Estonians because of the harshness of Soviet rule, but not for
long.

5,000 Estonians were murdered or sent to camps.

Perhaps

15,000 were sent off to forced labor in Germany; some chose
instead to serve in the military, and some were forced to do so.

-

-

-
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do so.

Estonian political leaders organized a provisional

government as the German war machine began to break down in order
to be prepared for liberation. 60
Unfortunately, the Soviets were not moved by this display of
nationhood when they returned as the Germans retreated.

They

quickly re-established control, and Estonia was again a Soviet
Socialist Republic.

A wave of Soviet immigration ensued because

of Soviet encouragement in some cases, but also because of better
living conditions and job opportunities (since the Soviets gave
out administrative jobs to Russians in Estonia).

The Estonians

naturally resented these immigrants, whom many characterize as
colonists, because they were essentially moving in and claiming
alien territory as their own. 61

-

-

..

-

The Estonians lived in terror of the purges and deportations
that were all too consistent between 1945-1953; they feared
losing their lives, their houses, their jobs, their farms, their
loved ones.

Stalin made a point of making his violence

widespread enough to inspire fear everywhere.

An alien imperial

power had come in and set up a colonial state in Estonia. 62
In March 1949 Stalin had about 20,000 Estonian farmers
deported because they weren't collectivizing fast enough.

There

were widespread injustices in housing allocation, etc. in favor
of Russian "colonists."
native Estonian.

In 1945, 94 percent of Estonia was

In 1953, 72 percent was Estonian, and that

number included an extra group: Estonians who had gone to Russia
between 1850 and 1920 and then come back in the 1940s because of

26

better condi tions-- "Russian Estonians. ,,63

-

-

The new minority of

Russians, artificially injected into Estonia, set up the
potential for conflict in the 1980s and 1990s when Estonia began
to press for autonomy and then independence from the Soviet
Union.
Many countries, then, have been colonized or ruled by some
external power.

Why is it that only some explode in horrific

violence as Yugoslavia and Rwanda did?

The deciding element is a

mixture of internal factors and external factors.

..

In examining

these countries, common themes emerge, and differences become
clear as well.

Each had to struggle throughout its history

against the designs of outside forces, and each has been the
victim of significant interference in its ethnic, social, and/or

-

religious composition and traditions.

Other nations, sometimes

the international community in the form of the U.N., have often
acted on misperceptions in each country as well, and have

..

sometimes defined their priorities according to political
expediency rather than in the interest of the people in question.
More examples of this can be found in the more recent history of

-

these three areas.

-

Yugoslavia and see many instances of misunderstandings,

Starting with Bosnia, one can follow the disintegration of

interference, and attempts at aid by other nations.

In 1987,

Slobodan Milosevic took power in the Serbian Communist Party.

-

-

His rise is important because the revival of nationalisms and
divisions that would tear Bosnia apart really started with him.
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He was a fiery politician who won popularity by criticizing the

--

Serbian Communist Party leadership's policy on KoSOVO. 64

Kosovo

was the site of the Serbs' defeat at the hands of the Ottoman
Turks on June 28, 1389 (the beginning of the 450 year Ottoman
occupation of Serbia), and the day remains sacred to Serbs. 65
Tito's Yugoslavia only worked by consensus, and if leaders

--

didn't use nationalism or populist activism to appeal to the
people.

By raising the flag of nationalism, Milosevic broke the

first of Tito's taboos.

He wanted to gain power in the party,

and his method worked well.

The Serbs began to follow him, be-

lieving his stories of the oppression of Kosovo's Serbian minority.

The Kosovo province is about 90 percent ethnic Albanian,

the rest Serbian.

His success was fueled by his next step, the

breaking of Tito's second taboo, when he began to mobilize the

-

..

Serbian masses.

To do this, he orchestrated a network of

demonstrations in various towns in around Serbia.

This network

was "part of a well-organized plan, designed to intimidate the
non-Serb peoples of Yugoslavia, instill among Serbs the idea that
their fellow Serbs were being ... discriminated against," and to
stress the position of Milosevic as "the undisputed master of
post-Ti to Yugoslavia.

,,66

On the 600th anniversary of the Battle

of Kosovo, Milosevic spoke at a rally on the site of the ancient
battle, "the Field of Blackbirds" in Kosovo; he had over one
million Serbs gathered in the middle of a largely Albanian prov-

..

-

ince.

His message to the other republics was hardly one of

tolerance, as he spoke of present battles becoming violent. 67

.
-

-

..
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This kind of demonstration of power was immediately
recognized as a potential threat by the other republics of
Yugoslavia, although the international community was either
unaware or hoping to ignore its significance.

Thus Yugoslav

politics descended into nationalism and propaganda-fueled
accusations.
The Slovenes were the first to raise a protest to
Milosevic's policies, foreshadowing the rivalries of the next few
years. 68

Franjo Tudjman was elected president of Croatia in

April of 1990, and after that, Milosevic made the small leap from

....

championing the cause of the Serb minority in Kosovo to that of
the Serb minority in Croatia. 69

..

-

-

only get worse.

From this point things could

In response to the position of Milosevic, the

other Yugoslav republics began to adopt more nationalistic
agendas as well.

The Muslim President of Bosnia, Alija

Izetbegovic, faced a particularly difficult situation, because
his republic was in-between Serbia and Croatia, homes of the most
intense feelings--in addition Bosnia had many Serbs and Croats
inside its borders.

He tried to stay out of the arguing between

Serbia and Croatia, believing that modernity and the cosmopolitan
nature of Bosnia and especially Sarajevo would triumph in the
end, but that would not prove to be enough.

The other republics

believed their only alternative to verbally attacking Serbia was
to accept Serbian dominance over areas that were not legally

-

Serbian and they refused to let that happen. 'o
In 1989, Milosevic abolished the autonomy of Kosovo and

..
29
Vojvodina.

..

He had staged demonstrations in each, supposedly of

people clamoring for new governments.

In reality these were

controlled by Milosevic himself, and he put his allies in power

..

..
..

in each province. 71

The conflict in Kosovo today dates from this

institution of Serbian control.

In April of 1998 Milosevic sent

in armed policemen into Kosovo to crack down on alleged
supporters of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), an anti-Serbian,
pro-independence terrorist group.

About 80 ethnic Albanians were

killed in the initial clashes, and since then sporadic violence

..

has continued.

The situation is much like the beginning of the

war in Bosnia in 1992.
What does Milosevic have to do with Bosnia?

Everything,

because the pressure that Milosevic put on Kosovo over the Serb

..

minority he then put on Croatia because of its Serb minority, and
eventually he backed the minority of the Bosnian Serbs as well.
He began Yugoslavia's breakup, the animosity, the fear.
Milosevic wanted to make Yugoslavia a centralized state (a
greater Serbia) instead of a federation, and after talks the

..

..
..

other republics became so frustrated that they considered
secession.

This is what Slovenia and Croatia did in 1991.

Various moves had been made by the u.S. and others in 1990 to
show support for the governmental negotiations, and to advocate
unity for the Yugoslav state.72
Secretary of State James Baker Ill's last minute trip to

..
..
..

Belgrade on the eve of Slovenia and Croatia's secession was to
advocate unity.

Baker remarked to some reporters that a possible

..
30

..
conflict in Balkans could be the source of World War 111.'3

..

is an indication that the U.S. government did appreciate the
serious consequences of a conflict in the Balkans.

..

..

This

If that is

true, however, one would have thought that Baker would not have
made the trip; many have said Milosevic took Baker's plea for
unity as a license to use force.'·

Judging from Milosevic's

track record, however, he didn't need a great deal of

..
..

..

..

..
..

..
..

..
..
..
..
...

justification; he doesn't usually attempt to court much
international approval unless he is hurting at home.

So this

action by the U.S. probably did not push Milosevic to his
decision to send tanks and soldiers into Slovenia and Croatia to
keep them from leaving Yugoslavia .
However, the international community may be more responsible
for the eventual atrocities in Bosnia.
confusing policies toward Yugoslavia.

The West pursued
Initially, the U.S. and

most of the European Union wanted to move slowly in recognizing
Slovenia and Croatia's independence.

Germany pushed hard for

quick recognition to be given by the end of 1991, even though it
was uncertain whether or not Croatia had met important human
rights requirements assigned to it.

Germany went ahead and

announced in December it would recognize the two new states
unconditionally in January of 1992.

The EU had little leverage

to get compliance from Croatia after that, and so it followed
suit shortly after.

The U.S. did as well, but somewhat later.'s

Bosnia was put in a terrible position because of all of this .
Germany forced early recognition mainly because of domestic

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-
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concerns.

These included a Croat population of 500,000 in

Germany which was a powerful lobby, and a desire to promote the
ideal of self-determination after successfully using it
themselves to unify East and West Germany.76
This is another example of disregard of the needs of the
Bosnian people--because international obligations are usually
dropped in favor of domestic concerns when there is no security
issue at stake.

It is also a question of perception and

priority, because Germany believed that the Slovenes, Croats, and
even Bosnians would be able to "self-determine" their status
fairly and peacefully.

The German leaders also believed that

this was best; secession was good for the breakaway republics.
German priority was on domestic reasonings and on the value of
choice. 77 The dangers to Bosnia, because of the complexity of
the Yugoslav situation, were not fully considered.
President Izetbegovic went to Germany to discuss his fears
for the survival of Bosnia, so the Germans could not plead
ignorance of the dangers to Bosnia.

-

They simply didn't want to

see them or believe them, and probably its other goals previously
discussed were more important to them than Bosnia's survival.
The problem was that Bosnia had a substantial Serb minority,

..

which was opposed to independence and thus the feeling was that

-

could secede and face war from its minority.7s

..

-

either Bosnia would stay in a Serbian dominated Yugoslavia or it

And in the end, the Bosnians chose the latter, and the war
that ensued was more terrible than anyone could have imagined.

..

..
..
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Rape used as a weapon, concentration camps set up, mass graves
again marred European soil.

No government wanted to understand

any of this because it is much easier to ignore difficult things,

..
..

..
..
..

..
..
..
..

..
..

..
..

..
..

..

especially when they cry out for action that one wants to avoid
taking.

Wanting to know is very important, as is perception in

such complicated conflicts.

It wasn't until so many television

stations began broadcasting footage of the suffering that
Americans did anything to help the Bosnian people.

President

Clinton favored a policy of lifting the arms embargo and
launching air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions that he seemed to
forget to discuss with the allies before trying to pitch it to
them.

He also didn't seem to realize he needed to pitch it

enthusiastically to get their support.

He then returned to the

American people and told them that we wanted to do something, but
now the allies won't let us.

If he'd really wanted to do it,

surely he knew the proper way to get it done.

Author Patrick

Glynn suggests that again, the U.S. knew a lot more about the
situation in Bosnia than they appeared to.

He says that

officials toned down statements because they didn't really want
to get involved in the conflict. 79
It was easy for U.S. officials to feign ignorance of the
troubles because there was a lot of misinformation floating
about.

Glynn cites intelligence reports that predicted the

possible violent collapse of the country as early as 1990.

He

quotes George Kenney, the acting head of the Yugoslav section of
the State Department who resigned in protest in 1992, as saying,

-
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"'We knew perfectly well what was going on over there.'

"so

This

may all be true, but if people don't want to know something, they
can be very persistent in not facing the evidence.

••

It is more

convenient to think of the Balkans as a land of ancient hatreds
and hopeless, endless violence, even if one should understand

••

.,

-

-

..
..

-

..

-

..
..

events as contemporary political maneuvering.

If facts don't

match one's impressions, one's perceptions, one can always decide
the facts are wrong.

This is what top level U.S. officials did,

to a great extent.
The issues of not wanting to know were just as involved in
how the U.S. dealt with the 1994 crisis in Rwanda.

Foreign

involvement in Rwanda has been significant ever since the Germans
journeyed to Africa; to explore reaction to the most recent
crisis we must step back first.

The first president of

independent Rwanda was Gregoire Kayabanda.

His grip on power did

not last very long however, as General Juvenal Habyarimana, then
Defense Minister, seized power in 1973.

Writer Frank Smyth says

that Habyarimana "promised to be fair to both Hutu and Tutsi;
instead he distributed most of the resources and key positions to
family, friends and associates from the region of his birthplace
in northwestern Rwanda."

He continued with the tradition of one-

party rule, and he did not allow Hutus who did not agree with
him, or any Tutsis, to serve in his government. 81
many forms of external influences in Rwanda.

There were

Besides his

internal systems of control and support, Habyarimana also enjoyed
the support of foreign governments.

He and his family had close

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-
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ties with French President Mitterand and his family.82

A

profitable arms trade existed between Rwanda and both France and
Belgium, as well as with South Africa and some Middle Eastern
states. 83

Both France and Belgium were strong supporters of

Habyarimana's regime.

France and Belgium's influence in Rwandan

affairs, especially that of France, is a good study of how people
are affected by forces outside of their domestic government.
The thousands of Tutsi refugees who fled Rwanda in 1959 and
1960 could be considered another external factor.

Refugees did

not play such a role in Bosnia, but as I have said, Yugoslav
emigres and others who supported one nationalist cause or another
could be found in the U.S. and elsewhere, as in Germany (the
Croatian population there was a huge supporter for early
recognition).

Known as Banyarwanda, these Rwandans ended up

scattered throughout Tanzania, Burundi, Zaire, but concentrated
in Uganda, and would become the "largest and longest-standing
unresolved refugee problem in Africa" by 1990. 84

This problem

was something no one in the international community was really
monitoring.

Upon seeing the "Hutu Power" (the name for the

Rwandan state ideology and power junta) forces take over their
country, the Tutsi refugees' feelings of exclusion were
reinforced--it seemed impossible to go home.

Many Tutsi men

joined the Ugandan army and fought against Idi Amin and his
regime's human rights violations.
gained favor with the Ugandans.

Thus the Tutsis naturally
When the children of these

exiles reached fighting age, many of them joined the military as

--

-

-

..

..

..
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well. 85
The exiles were waiting for the civil and political rights
situation to improve, but according to Gourevitch, Habyarimana
insisted repeatedly that there wasn't any more room in Rwanda
anyway since ninety-five percent of the land was already tied up
in farming.

In 1986 Habyarimana announced with an air of

finality that the debate was pointless because the country was
just too crowded, and no amount of negotiat,ion was going to
change that.

The next year, a group called the Rwandan Patriotic

Front (RPF) was formed, mainly from the pool of Tutsi officers in
the Ugandan army.

By 1990 their aim was to overthrow the Hutu

Power governing system, and so they ended up launching a military
invasion against their home country; in this way the first of the
expelled Tutsis came home.

This began a complicated war.

a civil war, or an external invasion?

Was it

The Ugandans obviously

gave some supplies, but not direct military aid.
invading considered themselves Rwandan.

The Tutsis

The reasons they fled in

the first place were the fault of the colonial government--the
artificial divisions and power structure that the Belgians had
set up sparked the violence of the 1960s and the outflow of
refugees. 86
Among purely internal issues were the problems Habyarimana's
government faced in the late 1980s.

Rwandan citizens began

calling for a pluralistic political system.

Various Hutu

opposition parties and groups that had formed began clamoring to
be included in real elections.

There was also a huge ongoing

-

-

-

-

-

-
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economic crisis, and for a country that is among the poorest in
Africa and whose population has one of the world's highest
percentages of
disaster. B7

HIV-positive people, these new crises bordered on

Habyarimana seemed fated to open the doors of his

tight political house.

However, it was also at this point that

the RPF, the Tutsi-dominated force of refugees from Uganda,
decided it was time to take back its share of its country: the
RPF invaded Rwanda on October 1, 1990.

The invasion was to be a

temporary salvation for Habyarimana; there is nothing like a
common enemy to unite opposing groups.

Suddenly all Tutsis were

under suspicion of supporting the invasion, and even the few

-

-

rights they had been accorded before were now taken from them. Be
Arbitrary detainment, executions, beatings, and rapes were
methods used by both the guerrillas and the Rwandan government,
though more so by government forces. B9
France also sent troops to show its solidarity with the
Habyarimana regime and oppose the RPF invasion.

At least 300

troops were sent in 1990, and there is some disagreement over
whether they actually fought with the Rwandan army or just
observed and advised. 90

David Rieff writes that they intervened

again in 1992 after peace talks broke down and it looked like

-

-

tithe political settlement in Rwanda would be achieved by
massacre. 11 91

France upped its troop numbers to 680 in 1993 to

contain a new offensive by the RPF. 92

In light of all of these

actions, one Belgian official wished that France would "'take a
more outspoken policy on democracy and human rights,'" because,

-
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as other officials remarked, French efforts as they stood "were
undermining collective diplomatic efforts to influence the
regime. ,,93
Frank Smyth, author of a Human Rights Watch report on arms
deals and human rights abuses in Rwanda, says that "the militias
organized mobs of agitated Hutu that went to villages and fields
in search of Tutsi," killing in total about 2000 people.
According to Smyth, the government of Rwanda also had at least
8,000 Tutsi arrested with little if any pretense of evidence.
The RPF was ruthless as well, and Smyth states that in the course
of the war they executed some military prisoners and hundreds of
Hutu citizens they believed to be supporters of Habyarimana;
perhaps thousands were "forcibly dislocated," and soldiers took

till

-

-

-

..

-

some civilians to use as servants. 94
After peace terms were negotiated in late 1992, there was a
renewal of hostilities in February 1993, and then agreements were
finally signed in Arusha, Tanzania that ended the war. 9S

An

international commission came to Rwanda in 1993 to investigate
human rights violations during the war and documented such abuses
as those described above.

"The •.. commission was created,

funded, and fully sponsored by international nongovernmental
organizations," and because it was an international effort, "its
report gained a high level of credibility. ,,96

The commission is

important because its report was available to all states in late
1993, and those like France and the United States who would say
that human rights violations had not occurred between 1990 and

-
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1993 could only do so by knowingly ignoring the facts.
The report did help alter some policies, however, showing

-

-

-

,.

-

that international action can have a positive impact.

France

ended up complying with a cease-fire that asked for the removal
of French troops.91

Belgium, already repentant about its support

of either side in the conflict, recalled its Ambassador for
consultation after the report's release.

Clearly, Belgium was

concerned about not making the Rwanda situation worse, unlike
most other countries who were still profiting from arms sales.

A

Belgian official called a meeting with the commission's co-chair,
in order to ask for advice, saying, "'We accept your report.
What should we do? I ,,98
The policies of Belgium and France played other important
and contrasting roles in the unfolding of the civil war that need
to be explored in detail to illustrate some complex issues of
international roles in one country's conflicts.

Belgium tended

to be responsive to the human rights violations it saw, whereas
France generally exacerbated problems.

Belgium and France had

both been strong supporters and influences for Rwanda since its
independence in 1962, but as Belgian influence decreased over the
1980's after traditionally being Rwanda's closest ally and trade

-

,.

partner, France began to pick up the slack. 99

When the RPF

invaded Rwanda, Belgium stopped all arms sales and "lethal aid"
because of its unusual policy of not selling arms to any
belligerent nation at war.

France, however, did not let morality

interfere with economics, and continued a lively trade with the

..
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Rwandan government even as it committed human rights violations
against the rebels and its own ci tizens. 100
Not only did France sell arms to Rwanda, it also helped
facilitate Rwanda's purchases of arms from other countries.

...
...

-

In

1992, Credit Lyonnais, a nationalized French bank, guaranteed a
six million dollar weapons and equipment purchase by Rwanda of
Egyptian merchandise in a "secret military assistance credit"
that "has since become a subsidy."

The Rwandan government was

supposed to pay the Egyptians one million dollars up front, one
million after a large tea crop was harvested, and the other four

-

million dollars over the next four years.

be responsible, as the guarantor, for any unpaid portions.

Smyth

writes that most private banks would never commit to such a risky
backing.

...
...

Credit Lyonnais would

And by 1994, it appeared to have backfired for France--

when the civil war in Rwanda re-escalated in February 1993, the
economy took a turn for the worse, and the tea field mentioned in
the repayment plan was taken over by the Tutsi rebels, leaving
Ii ttle left to pay Egypt and only gratitude to give France. 101

...

Why did France feel such a strong connection with

...

Habyarimana?

As I have mentioned, a personal relationship had

...

probably itself stemming from France's economic interests in

grown up between the French President and the Rwandan President,

Rwanda with its arms trade, and the countries remained close

...
...

...

through the changes in French leadership.

France also wanted to

"maintain its credibility in French-speaking Africa.

,,102

The

Tutsis from Uganda were more likely to speak English than French,

-
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whereas in Rwanda both French and the native Kinyarwanda are
official languages 103

-

All of these interests may have been

products of (or secondary to) strategic interests, however, as
one author points out that France believed "preserving a Frenchspeaking zone in Africa ... would, along with a nuclear arsenal,
secure France's status as a major power and also secure its
permanent seat on the Security Council. ,,104

Again, one can see

..

that most nations go after their own interests first, ignoring

...

pay with their lives .

..

-

-

-

any unpleasant facts about brutality or atrocities, and others

Is France complicit in the regime's abuses of human rights
because it sold the arms used in the acts?

A French colonel in

Rwanda responded to some of Frank Smyth's questions about French
military aid and activity in Rwanda by saying, "Are you saying
that the providing of military assistance is a human rights
violation? ,,105

This question is provocative.

Since Rwanda has a

history of having authoritarian, one-party, one-"ethnic" group
governments, either imposed by foreign powers or, if a home-grown
regime, enjoying the fairly unconditional endorsement of the same
foreign powers (along with a few others), many in the population
of Rwanda have often had their lives shaped by the will or
influence of others.

France is simply playing a variation on

those themes of Rwandan history, and like a colonialist or
dictator or other past offender, it must accept some blame.
To fault a state for supporting a regime violating human
rights would necessitate definite documentations or obvious signs

..

-
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that a regime was doing so and the supportive state knew about
it.

..

..
..

Did France and the rest of the international community have

such knowledge during the 1990-1993 civil war about the Rwandan
government?

Should they have seen these and later signs as

warnings of the genocide to come?

Evidence indicates they should

have.
In 1992, as the civil war raged on, a close friend of
Habyarimana made a speech that became instantly infamous.

Leon

Mugesera, vice president of a city chapter of Habyarimana's
National Revolutionary Movement for Development party (MRND is

-

-

..

..

the French acronym), basically said that Tutsis are evil and
should be purged from the great country of Rwanda.

Author David

Rieff cites the following remarks from the speech:
The fatal mistake we made in 1959 was to let them [the
Tutsis] get out ... They belong in Ethiopia and we are going to
find a shortcut to get there by throwing them into the
Nyabarongo river .... We have to act. Wipe them all out!106
Philip Gourevitch quotes Mugesera further, "We the people are
obliged to take responsibility ourselves and wipe out this
scum. ,,101
The government-run radio was equally inflammatory; it
broadcast news-like warnings of Tutsis coming to kill all Hutus.
Radio des Milles Collines, "owned by members of Habyarimana's
inner circle," seems to have been the main offender, although
Radio Rwanda is also mentioned as another source of hate
propaganda. 108 Other forms of media inci ted hatred as well; the
newspaper Kangura published the "'Hutu Ten Commandments,n soon

-

..

..

..
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after the RPF attack in 1990.

Number Eight was "The Hutus should

stop having mercy on the Tutsis.

,,109

Number Ten was "' We shall

consider a traitor any Hutu who will persecute his Hutu brother
for having read, spread, and taught this ideology,'" which
effectively condemned all moderate Hutus. 110

Clearly, France must

have known the kind of regime it was sending its troops to aid
and for which it was subsidizing arms sales.

United States

offiCials, despite the violent human rights abuses during the
civil war discussed earlier and these propaganda machinations,
still could be found saying in a 1992 report to Congress that
"'there is no evidence of any systematic human rights abuses by
the military or any other element of the government of

..

Rwanda.

-

France, they might have interfered with its economic and

-

-

,,,111

It is probable that the U.S., France, and others

ignored these signs because they did not wish to see them.

political relationship with Rwanda and its leaders.

For the

U.S., accepting the reality of problems fomenting in Rwanda could
have meant accepting the need to intervene, or send more aid and
development money_
All of this hate-inspiring speech and propaganda was going
on in the context of a civil war, and Habyarimana's fear of
losing power to either the Tutsis or to other Hutus.

Rwanda's

recent history might have been very different had this hate
campaign ended when hostilities did.

However, after a peace

treaty was signed in 1993, tensions in Rwanda were still running
high, and the divisive public broadcasts and speeches didn't

..

For

-

-

..

43

stop.

Radio des Milles Collines broadcast statements

"terrorizing the Hutu with warnings about the evil Tutsi-led RPF
and Hutu oppositionists, who were labeled 'enemies' or 'traitors'
and who 'deserved to die. ,,,112

Rieff writes that the radio

stations "had called upon the militants to kill everyone, even
the children," and that Radio des Milles Collines reminded the
Hutu that "'the grave is only half full'" of Tutsis, as half fled
after the Hutu uprising in 1959, and asked "'Who will help us
fi 11 it?'

,,113

According to several scholars, there is plenty of evidence

..
..

-

that Habyarimana and the coterie of individuals keeping him in
power had been planning for years a systematic campaign to get
rid of all Tutsis. 114

A regime enjoying the full support of many

foreign governments, and the special friendship of France, was
planning genocide right under their noses.

Although this

information is recent, there were yet more signs at the time, in
early 1994, that warned of the summer's violence to come that the
international community overlooked or ignored.

Canadian General

Romio Dallaire commanded the 2,500 troops that were the United

-

-

Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), and he received
distressing information through a Rwandan informant about Hutu
plans to kill Tutsis.

which he said that the Hutu informant had orders to "'register
all Tutsis in Kigali.

-

Dallaire sent a cable in January 1994 in

He suspects it is for their extermination.

Example he gave was that in twenty minutes his personnel could
kill up to ten thousand Tutsis.,"11s

This was a clear indication

..

..
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of the massacres that were to come, a suggestion of mass murder.
The Hutu informant was a military official who worked in Hutu
military training camps; but the camps were not shut down nor
their arms confiscated, and the U.N. would not even agree to
protect the informant.

Belgian officials unquestionably knew

about all of this, but did nothing; the U.N. decided not to bring

••

the informant's information before the Security Council.

It was

to become one more missed opportunity to prevent or lessen the
tragedy to come in April 1994. 116

It has not been explained why

nothing was done; the note seems like a clear warning.
it was discounted, or perhaps the source was unreliable.

Perhaps
Or

perhaps the matter was simply not perceived as important enough

..

to be concerned with .
The catalyst for putting this plan, which Habyarimana had
surely helped design, into action was his death.

..

On April 6,

President Habyarimana was flying back from Tanzania after meeting
with the President of Burundi and others to discuss his
compliance with the Arusha peace accords.

The plane was shot

down, apparently by surface-to-air missiles, upon its approach to

..
..

the Kigali airport, and all on board were killed.

which Habyarimana's Presidential Guard and the Rwandan Army
reacted after the tragedy is more evidence that plans had been
formulated for just such an event.

..

The speed with

The missiles came from the

area around Kigali airport; one writer states they came from the
Kanombe army base next to the airport. 117

Soldiers from the

Rwandan Army immediately surrounded this area, forestalling any

..

-
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attempt at investigation, which suggests that they had something
to hide.

Thus it could be that Hutu Power extremists shot down

the plane because they were angry at Habyarimana's softening on
power-sharing and agreeing to implement other aspects of the

..

-

peace accords.

However, the incident remains a mystery.

immediate response of Hutu leaders was that the RPF had done it,
and that remained their assertion. 118
The massacres of moderate Hutus and any Tutsis that could be
found began that night.

-

The

Again, the coordination of effort and

speedy mobilization of forces suggest that this was not a
spontaneous reaction, but an execution of orders.

All Rwanda's

previous human rights abuses pale in comparison, as the greater
tragedy they were hinting at finally unfolded in the deaths of
somewhere between 500,000 to 1 million people over three

.,

..
...

...

...

months. 119

The Hutu Presidential Guard mobilized village militias

and the formally trained Interhamwe (those who attack together)
and Impuzamugambi (those who have the same goal) militia groups;
all of these then proceeded to track down Hutu opposition
leaders, and to indiscriminate slaughter Tutsis by the
hundreds. no

Murders were committed with guns, machetes, even

artillery rounds were fired at times.

Ten Belgian peacekeepers

were killed the first day while trying to protect the Hutu Prime
Minister of Habyarimana's government Agathe Uwilingiyimana; she
had come into office under a new rule that the prime minister
should be from another party, and thus she was singled out for
assassination. 121

And this was only the beginning.

The genocide

..
..
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(the U.N. had acknowledged it as such by July of 1994) was only
stopped because RPF forces were able to defeat the Rwandan Army

..

and the bands of militias in a military campaign. l22
Besides the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, how did the international community cope with the
unthinkable reality of the human rights disaster in Rwanda?

At

..

first it simply didn't think about it, and thus didn't have to

..

try to cope.

Then it seemed to

cope in entirely the wrong ways .

A few examples illustrate the tragic flaws and bitter, costly
irony of the international response.

..
..
..
..

The United Nations delayed in labeling the tragedy genocide
for more than a month after the killings began, which many
believe was to avoid the obligations of intervention that the
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide entails.

The United States issued statements

cautioning against official use of the term in public
statements. l23

General Dallaire, the commander of UNAMIR, said on

April 21 that he could halt the slaughter if he had five to eight
thousand troops, but nothing was done. 124

By May the U.N.

Secretariat was trying to mobilize support for more troops, but
no member states would volunteer the needed men and materials. l25

..

France, with characteristic passion, launched Operation
Turquoise in June ostensibly to set up a safe zone to protect

..

civilians and allow humanitarian assistance access.

Some have

written that its real purpose was to prop up the Rwandan Army and
France's Hutu allies in the areas they still controlled. l26

..

-

47

Gourevitch writes that Interhamwe groups celebrated the troops'
presence with a sign that said "'Welcome French Hutus.

..

,,,127

safe zone that the French set up did accept "militia members, ...
propagandists from the ex-government, and ... Radio des Milles

..

Collines' spewing out its anti-RPF messages."

-

human rights situation in the conditions of disorder that

-

The

However, it is

hard to blame the French for not providing an ideal political and

characterized Rwanda at the time; one author writes that probably
several thousand Tutsis were saved because of their presence, and
that means a great deal--if they continue to survive the turmoil
in their country. 128

-

-

-

One can, however, blame the French for

continuing to sell arms to the Hutus while the killings went on,
as the Arms Proj ect of Human Rights Watch reported. 129
What are some of the underlying reasons for these responses
--or lack thereof, to be more accurate.

Rwanda was not a vital

security interest to any Western country except France, hence the
high degree of French involvement.

And the U.S. was not

interested in Rwanda, because, like Bosnia, whatever happened
there would not directly affect us.

There were no Rwandan

immigrants lobbying Congress, no interest groups giving money,
and Rwanda's warfare was often labeled "tribal."

-

to be some racism involved.

There does seem

Americans sometimes think very

little of African governments in general, and one country
descending into random violence does not surprise us.
similar things said about Bosnia, but less so.

There were

In both countries

political issues were rejected as motivations for violence in

..

..

..

-
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favor of simple ancient ethnic hatreds and ignorant stereotyping.
A cycle of violence was begun in Rwanda with colonial
repression, and it continued as one group of Rwandans would
periodically attack the other, and when the smaller violations of
human rights were continually ignored, they built up over the
years a situation that was exploited by the genocidal organizers
of the Habyarimana regime.

-

The early inconsistencies of Belgian

policy, the almost uniformly harmful policies of the French, and
the general indifference or ignorance of the rest of the world
helped keep an authoritarian government in power in Rwanda.
World leaders also managed to let themselves miss all the danger

-

signals that flashed ever-brighter as the conflicts within
Rwandan society grew ever more unsolvable.

Rwanda and Bosnia

both exhibit many unusual and tragic human rights issues that

,.,

-

have their roots in the

complicated political and social history

of each; their tragedy is that few international actors wanted to
deal with complexity--they preferred to wait until the "simple"

..

horrors of mass murder would finally force them to act.

..

Rwanda than Titoist Yugoslavia.

..

-

..

Post-World War

for 45 years.

II

Estonia was actually more like occupied
Estonia was under communist rule

Its people were subject to deportations,

imprisonments, and executions; it was treated much as a colony .
It was a conquered territory, a conquered people.

The communist

party was of course in complete control of electoral processes.
At first the majority of members were Russians, or Russian
Estonians who had recently returned to Estonia.

In 1946,

49

-

Estonians only made up 17 percent of the Estonian Communist Party
(CPE) . 130

Russian was establ ished as the national language. 131

By 1954 the purges eased and Estonians began to feel at least a
sense of stability.

-

Estonian culture,"

In 1960 there began a "resurgence of
which started with literary arts.

in freedom of expression, living standards, and economic growth,
in nearly every facet of measurement, Estonia lagged far behind
the Western European countries, though in many ways ahead of the
rest of the Soviet Union. 132

..

-

But still,

begun to make waves.

By 1980, Estonians dissenters had

After one prominent activist died in

prison, pictures of his grave marked only by a numbered stake
made the international press and stirred up much support.

The

fledgling movement which had spawned him was crushed in 1982, but
remained an underground force. 133
In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became head of the Soviet Union,
and the crackdown eased considerably.

-

-

-

In 1987, many dissidents

were released from prison; opposition was becoming acceptable.
In 1986 and 1987 the first major protests were about
environmental issues, including media reports on workers sent to
clean up Chernobyl under dangerous conditions.

Estonians then

began to demand economic autonomy from Moscow.

In 1988, the

"singing revolution" began; Estonians gathered in June for an
established festival, but people stayed up all night singing and
waving the flags of independent Estonia.

This is a different

kind of protest than one saw in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda.
Here there were no politicians preaching hatred of group against

-

-

..
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group, and the thought of singing against one's opponents,
instead of vilifying them or fearing them, was conceivable .134
Western leaders were cautious in their support of Estonia
and the other Baltic states' bids for independence from the

-

-

Soviet Union.

Though Estonian citizenship laws have been criticized by some
human rights groups, they have not kept Estonia from joining the
Council of Europe or gaining associate membership to the European
Union. 136

..

But Estonia was recognized on 2 September 1991. 135

The international communi ty was watching more carefully

as Estonia made the transition to an independent nation.
of Russia nearby, Estonia's relationship with its minority
Russians is important for stability.

-

..
-

Because

Hanne-Margret Birckenbach

has written a paper on ways the international community acted to
foster non-violence in Estonia.

Estonian leaders very much

wanted to be a part of Europe; they got in the Council of Europe
in 1993, they wanted to join the European Union, eventually NATO
as well. 137

For the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, there were few

countries with a real interest in them--they are not so close to
a large country with nuclear weapons, and economically they were
not a large asset to any world power.

And so Estonia was watched

more carefully, and it worked.
But Bosnia is still not healed, and neither is Rwanda.

The

international community has placed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia
for its actions in Kosovo.
before and won't now.

That kind of measure didn't work

As if the record of the international

community did not speak for itself, world leaders seem determined

..

-

..
..

-

-
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to repeat the same patterns of behavior in Kosovo.

As one has

seen, high level officials can talk about doing the right thing
while selling arms to genocidaires, and they can avoid talking at
all, but they cannot be persuaded to act unless absolutely forced
to.

Like Bosnia, there is sporadic violence in Kosovo, not

between armies, but armed groups.

And like Bosnia, it is

difficult to get accurate information, there is a propaganda war
raging, and reciprocal violence is the norm.

On the internet one

can find pages defending the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Muslims,
the Kosovo Serbs, and the Kosovo movement for independence.
are perfectly contradictory, of course.

All

Hutu genocidaires in

Rwanda walk up to judges on their hearing dates and plead not

..

guilty, because they feel they were trying to help their country .

..

the job, of the international community to erase hatred, self-

It is not the job, nor is it possible even if one considers it

righteousness, and bloodthirstiness.

It is, however, the job of

the international community, of leaders like Clinton, Chirac,

..

Annan, and Yeltsin to make some kind of effort to stop the worst
effects of these characteristics when they appear so blatantly on
the world stage.

Estonia may have been helped to avoid ethnic

violence because of the more prominent role of external actors in

,..

,..

..

monitoring its situation, the more inclusive attitude of those
actors, and the more positive perceptions that they had of
Estonia.

In the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, however, other

countries either tried to stay away, or (as at times in the case
of Rwanda) were too involved.

After violence broke out, few

-

52

countries wanted to see what was going on--that might mean
politically risky action could be required--so they simply
ignored any indication of the truth until it was much too late.
Perceptions and priorities became self-fulfilling prophecies as

..

warning signs went unheeded and human suffering remained second

-

disorderly, but humans have become no more moral.

-

-

-

-

-

place to political expediency.

The world may have become more

-
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